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Abstract
Given the structural differences in banking sector and financial regulation
at country level in European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), this pa-
per tries to estimate the banking sector risk behavior at country level. Based
on contingent claim literature, it computes “Distance-to-default (DtD)” at
bank level and analyses the aggregate series at country level for a representa-
tive set of banks over the period 2004-Q4 to 2013-Q2. The indices provide an
intuitive, forward-looking and timely risk measure having strong correlations
with national/regional market sentiment indicators. An underlying trend
exists but causality tests suggest no systemic component. Cross-sectional
differences in DtD suggests fragility in EMU countries 12-18 months prior
to the crisis and better predictive ability than the regulatory index based on
large and complex banking institutions at European level. Furthermore, we
explore the reasons for this divergence using VAR estimates.
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1. Introduction
The 2007-08 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt
crisis have exacerbated the need to understand and monitor the bank risk
behavior. Renewed attention is being focused at the global scale to enhance
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and extend risk measurement methodologies. The eurozone is no exception
and the twin objective of the European Central Bank (ECB) - price and
financial system stability - places a strong emphasis on Systemically Impor-
tant Financial Institutions (SIFI) but relies on individual countries’ central
banks to supervise smaller financial institutions.
This paper deviates from this current and in our view excessive focus and
attention on detecting and monitoring risk at European banking level. We
take a step backward and introduce a micro approach to document and mon-
itor the buildup of banking sector risk at country level. Based on contingent
claims literature, we calculate “Distance-to-default (DtD)”at bank level and
analyze the aggregate series at country level for a representative set of banks
over the period 2004-Q4 to 2013-Q2. Conceivably, if regulators pay greater
attention to country-specific buildups of risk and their connectedness, they
might take actions earlier to mitigate the extent and impact of future crisis.
There are many reasons for this choice. First, the structure of the bank-
ing sector within EMU countries varies considerably. In the case of Germany,
Finland and the Netherlands, total banking sector assets are relatively con-
centrated, while in Italy, Greece, France and Austria, they are distributed
quite equitably. Figure 1 summarizes this information by plotting the relative
size of banking firms (by total assets in 2010) in individual EMU countries,
where the total asset of the biggest bank in a particular country is normal-
ized to one. Excessive asset concentration lowers regulatory cost but makes
countries vulnerable to the actions of individual institutions.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Second, countries economic dependence on the banking sector varies dras-
tically.1 Consider the case of Luxembourg, where the total financial assets
under management is roughly 25 times the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
at current prices while, in Greece, Italy and Finland, this multiple is less
than three (Figure 2a). In some countries, all financial services are provided
by banks, while in others there are specialized mortgage, pension and insur-
ance companies. Given the existence of deposit insurance at the national
level, governments implicitly or explicitly guarantee bank deposits; which in
1We consider total asset managed by banking firms as a proxy for relative economic
dependence.
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times of stress, can transfer huge contingent liabilities onto sovereign’s bal-
ance sheets and bailing out may lead to the weakening of government’s own
position.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Third, the excessive home bias in European banks’ asset portfolios (Fig-
ure 2b) creates a vicious circle for risk transfer between banks and sovereigns,
which creates perverse economic and political incentives for government to
save domestic banks. The existence of financial regulation at national level
provides governments with the means to pursue their own national interests.
Also noteworthy is the home bias in the private investors portfolio (Belke
and Schneider (2013)) which aggravates this problem further. Neighborhood
effects, close connectedness with certain countries and cross country differ-
ences in bailout strategy also motivate the monitoring of bank risk at country
level.
Given this background, the main objective of the paper is to document
the evolution of country level banking risk indices. The central questions
addressed here are: (1) Does this risk measure provide useful information on
the buildup of risk?; (2) Does it render utile insights into market sentiments?;
(3) Can it perform better than regulatory measure of prudential risk?; and
(4) Is there strong dependence among countries banking sector?
As it turns out, country level DtDs are simple, convenient and intuitive
forward looking risk measures. The level of DtD differentiates countries
based on the structural differences in their financial sectors and shows strong
correlations with national and regional market sentiments. The improved in-
formational content helps it outperform the regulatory risk measures based
at European level and the causal linkages run from aggregate country level
DtDs to Euro wide regulatory indicators. The country level DtDs do show
very high correlations but causality and connectedness tests reveal no sys-
temic component. This supports our argument of the need to measure risk
indices at country level.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways: (1) we use a
novel bottom-up approach to understanding systemic risk buildup in the
banking sector and risk-shifting behavior in EMU countries; (2) we use one
of the most comprehensive representative databases for the EMU financial
sector; (3) we do not neglect the banking sector of smaller countries, which
may not be relevant at EMU level but will be relevant at country level; and
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(4) to our knowledge, this is the first paper which tries to establish a link
between country-specific buildup of financial risk with euro-wide aggregate
risk indicators and national and regional market sentiments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the prior
literature that used different frameworks to understand bank fragility and
justifies our selection of DtD as banking risk indicator. Section 3 describes
the sample data used to construct, analyze and calibrate the individual and
aggregate DtD series. Section 4 first documents the behavior of returns,
volatility and DtD for each EMU country; it then analyses these behaviors
jointly and presents some cross-sectional econometric analysis to gauge the
predictive ability and market association of the country-specific DtD indica-
tors. Section 5 documents the connectedness among country level banking
risk. Section 6 draws conclusions.
2. Choice of risk indicator
Based on the survey of the existing risk measure techniques, we employed
three basic criteria for indicator selection. It should: (1) identify the existing
balance sheet fragility; (2) incorporate uncertainty using forward looking
market measure; and (3) provide quantifiable risk indicators to assess relative
creditworthiness (Gapen et al. (2005)). A comprehensive literature survey
suggest that most of bank risk indicators can be classified into two broad
categories.
The first or the traditional approach to assess the risk of a firm are based
on the pure balance sheet data (see Altman (1968), Altman and Katz (1976),
Kaplan and Urwitz (1979), Ohlson (1980), Zmijewski (1984), Blume et al.
(1998) among others). Key accounting ratios are identified and using multi-
variate discriminant or multinomial choice models, firm’s default probability
is estimated. However the consensus on the accuracy and stress prediction
ability of these indicators are relatively low.
These models have generally been criticized on three grounds: (1) the
absence of a underlying theoretical model; (2) the timeliness of the infor-
mation;2 and (3) the lack of uncertainty and forward-looking component.
The selected methodologies also introduce sample selection bias, generating
2These models use information from financial statements which are based on past per-
formance and are available only at a quarterly or an annual frequency; thus, they fail to
capture changes in the financial conditions of the borrowing firm.
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inconsistent coefficient estimates (e.g., Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow
(2004), Thomas et al. (2012)).
The second approach is pure market based. These are indices determined
directly in the market place (e.g. stock prices, aggregate realized volatility,
aggregate market leverage, turbulence (a measure of excess volatility relative
to market), liquidity ratios and credit condition (e.g., credit default swaps)).
Most of these measures lack an underlying theoretical framework but the
timely availability and continuous incorporation of information helps improve
the relative performance and predictive ability in some cases (see Agarwal
and Taffler (2008), Campbell et al. (2011), Gropp et al. (2006), Jorion (2006),
Vassalou and Yuhang (2004)).
In between these measures lies the contingent claims based model (CCA)
of Merton (1974) which provides a theoretical underpinning and answers
some of these criticisms. The basic model is based on the priority structure
of balance sheet liabilities and uses the standard Black-Scholes option pricing
formula to value the junior claims as call option on firms’ value with the
value of senior claims as default barrier. The structural underpinning and
the combination of market-based and accounting information helps obtain
a comprehensive set of financial risk indicators, e.g: DtD, probabilities of
default, credit spreads, etc.
Additionally, this measure captures the current period instability (using
volatility), a forward-looking component (using stock prices) and balance
sheet mismatch (using capital structure), in accordance with our require-
ments. It has been widely applied to assess the ability of corporates, banks
and sovereigns to service their debt. Banking applications follow CCA by
interpreting a bank’s equity as a call option on its value given the limited
liability of shareholders. This approach was further refined by Vasicek (1984)
and Crosbie and Bohn (2003) and is applied professionally in Moody’s KMV
to predict default.
The DtD approach has been widely cited and reviewed by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF), European Central Bank (ECB) and Office
of Federal Research (OFR) as a tool for enhancing bank risk analysis. A
number of applications of this approach have been studied to analyze dif-
ferent dimensions of risk. Several papers have examined the usefulness of
DtD as a tool for predicting corporate and bank failure (Jessen and Lando
(2015), Koutsomanoli-Filippakia and Mamatzakis (2009), Qia et al. (2014),
Kealhofer (2003), Oderda et al. (2003), Vassalou and Yuhang (2004), Gropp
et al. (2006), Harada et al. (2010), Thomas et al. (2012)). They have found
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DtD to be a powerful measure to predict bankruptcy and rating down-
grades. Comparative analysis of DtD (Hillegeist et al. (2004), Campbell
et al. (2008), Bharath and Shumway (2008), Vassalou and Yuhang (2004),
Jessen and Lando (2015) and Agarwal and Taffler (2008)) also suggests that
DtD can be a powerful proxy to determine default.
2.1. Calculation methodology
The foundation for this model lies with the structural model of default
developed by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). Since equity is
a junior claim to debt, it can be modeled and calculated as a standard call
option on the assets with exercise price equal to the value of risky debt (also
known in the literature as distress barrier or default barrier).
The model uses no arbitrage conditions and assumes a frictionless market.
The stochastic process generating the firm’s assets return are described by
the diffusion process with a constant variance per unit time (σA). Following
standard literature, we assume that financial distress and bankruptcy are
costless.3 A firm has a simple capital structure with N shares of common
stock with market capital E and zero coupon bonds with a face value of D
with time to maturity T . The estimation methodology is as follows.
We use the value conservation equation:
A = E +De−rT (1)
Given the assumption of assets distributed as a Generalized Brownian
Motion, the application of the standard Black-Scholes option pricing formula
(Black and Scholes (1973)) yields the closed-form expression:
E = AN(d1)− e−rTDN(d2) (2)
where r is the risk-free rate under risk-neutrality, and N(∗) is the cumu-
lative normal distribution. The values of d1 and d2 are expressed as:
d1 =
ln(A
D
) + (r + 0.5σ2A)T
σA
√
T
(3)
d2 = d1 − σA
√
T (4)
3Here we assume that equity market price will reflect the cost of bankruptcy.
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The Merton model uses an additional equation that links the asset volatil-
ity σA to the volatility of the bank’s equity σE by applying Ito’s Lemma:
σE = N(d1)
A
E
σA (5)
Using Eqs. 2 and 5, we obtain the implied asset value A and volatility
σA, by inverting the two relationships. Once numerical solutions for A and
σA are found, the T periods ahead DtD is calculated as:
DtD =
A−D
σAA
(6)
DtD can be interpreted as the number of standard deviations the value
of a firm’s asset is away from its default barrier. This standardization across
firm size and volatility can be used to rank firms in terms of their relative
credit worthiness. The three key inputs in calculating the DtD (market capi-
talization, debt, and the volatility of equity) implies that it can be influenced
by the leverage ratio (debt/(equity + debt)) and volatility of the firm. A
higher value of DtD can be obtained either because the leverage of the firm
is low or because the volatility is low or both (Figure 3).
[Figure 3 about here.]
As can be noted, at a fixed level of volatility and low levels of leverage,
DtD changes are small and insignificant for changes in leverage; while for
a constant level of leverage, DtD shows much sharper drops for changes in
equity volatility. This implies that more than leverage, it is equity volatility
that has a greater influence in driving large changes in DtD (Thomas et al.
(2012)). Note that here we don’t intend to improve the performance of this
risk measure technique but aim to use it more effectively in order to capture
the banking sector fragility. This approach will help supplement the existing
methodologies that failed to capture vulnerabilities prior to this crisis.
3. Data
The sample selection methodology is as follows: First, an exhaustive
list of all listed and delisted monetary financial institutions is selected from
Bankscope4 database (as on 10th February 2014). We obtain a total of 199
4It provides a comprehensive balance sheet data for financial companies.
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firms in western Europe. Secondly, only firms whose shares were publicly
listed and traded between the last quarter of 2004 till the second quarter of
2013 and are headquartered in EMU countries are selected. Finally, credit
institutions which are pure-play insurance, pension or mortgage banks are
removed. To formalize this decision, we use Datastream as an additional
source of information. The major reason for this exclusion is the difference
in liability structure and business model compared to banks. However it
doesn’t mean that they are less risky to the financial system.
This choice also ensures that the selected banks share the same accounting
currency. However, it does not mean that they have a similar exchange rate
risk profile, since the level of foreign currency exposure will depend on their
respective asset profiles. The market-based data include daily observations
of risk-free interest rates, daily stock price and total outstanding share in
public. The list of variables and data sources are summarized in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here.]
Firms which were listed, delisted, nationalized or suffered any other rel-
evant corporate actions are considered in the data set until they stopped
trading on public exchanges. Due to the varying number of corporate ac-
tions every quarter, the number of firms in the sample changes over time,
both for the full sample and for individual countries (Figure 4) though the
core banks remains the same over time. They have an aggregate weight of
78% at the beginning of 2006 and of 86% at the end of it 2013-Q2. Therefore,
we honestly do not think that changes in the bank sample composition over
time may have a relevant impact on the forecasting properties of the dataset.
The comprehensive list of firms used in this analysis is summarized in Table
2.5 This detailed list of firms represents one of the best references for the
EMU banking sector.
[Table 2 about here.]
[Figure 4 about here.]
Computation of individual DtD: DtD is not measured directly; it is re-
covered implicitly from the balance sheet and market price of firm’s liabilities.
5The period for which each firm was traded is also available but is not presented here
in order to save space. This information is available from the authors upon request.
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For our analysis we compute DtD at quarterly frequency. In practical terms,
this means that the balance sheet information has to be modified from its
original quarterly, half-yearly, or in few cases, yearly frequencies using cubic
spline interpolation. Also the real debt contracts are not all written with a
single terminal date. To overcome this problem, a common procedure used
by Moody’s KMV (Vasicek (1984)) and also employed here, is to adopt a
one year horizon (T = 1), but to weight longer term debt (maturity > 1
year) at only 50% of face value. The debt barrier (D) will then be equal
to the face value of short-term liabilities plus half of the long-term liabili-
ties. Equity value of the firm (E) is computed as the quarterly average of
daily market capitalization (number of common shares x share prices) while
quarterly historical volatility based on daily log-returns is taken as equity
volatility (σE). The individual DtD is then calibrated using the procedure
outlined in Section 2.
Aggregating DtD series: In practice, the extension of DtD series as a
system wide indicator has two major difficulties: (1) At what level should
they be aggregated? Since we aim to focus on country level risk measurement
in EMU, we would aggregate the DtD at country level; and (2) How can
individual banks’ data be aggregated as a system-wide representation? Here
we follow Saldias (2013), Harada and Ito (2008) and Harada et al. (2010),
and take the simple cross-sectional equal-weighted average at each point in
time for all banks headquartered in a particular country as the aggregated
risk measure. The simple average DtD for country i at time t is represented
by aDtDi,t:
aDtDi,t = (1/N)
N∑
j=1
DtDj,t (7)
whereDtDj,t is the individualDtD for firm j at time t having headquarter
in country i.
This aggregation approach offers relative risk measures and is very at-
tractive in terms of policy advice. However, this methodology has two major
drawbacks. First, it ignores the latest modifications in DtD measurements
to improve its relative performance (see Jessen and Lando (2015), Gray and
Malone (2008) and Saldias (2013)). Since our focus is not on performance
improvement of DtD, we took the most basic and intuitive measure to un-
derstand bank risk. Secondly, it doesn’t incorporate the joint distribution
properties (see Gray et al. (2007), Gray and Jobst (2010), Duggar and Mitra
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(2007), Gray et al. (2010) and Jobst and Gray (2013)). Since our aim here
is to evaluate the underlying linkages among country level risk, we don’t in-
corporate a priori dependence structure among banking institutions in our
aggregation technique.
Country-level aDtD: To visualize the country-wise banking risk behavior,
we plot the aDtD for individual EMU countries (Figure 5). As can be seen,
the level of aDtD differs considerably across countries. The series together
show a trend and the variability across time is high. The pre-crisis level of
aDtD is high (above 4) for almost all countries with Greece, Austria and Ire-
land at the lower end. During the crisis period, all countries saw corrections
in aDtD with Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria and Greece showing huge
drops in aDtD level. Post 2007-08, the graph also suggest that the level of
aDtD remain low for most of the countries suggesting that it is able to catch
the trend and fluctuations during the current crisis.
[Figure 5 about here.]
4. Analysis
4.1. Does aDtD provide information regarding risk buildup?
As banking stress indicators, we compare the evolution of aDtD with
banking sector equity and volatility indices.6 Figure 6 plots aDtD, bank
equity index and volatility for each EMU country separately. The left axis
represents the equity index level while the right axis represents the annualized
volatility in percentage. The level of aDtD is scaled to show the general trend
and variation with time. The graphs suggest that aDtD started deteriorating
for most countries between 2006-07, except for France and the Netherlands.
Notably, it started declining when bank index level showed an upward trend
while volatility was quite stable.7
6The country wise bank equity index is based on average logarithmic returns of all
publicly traded banking firms headquartered in a particular country and are normalized
to 100 for all countries at the beginning of the last quarter in 2004. The volatility is
equal weighted annualized equity price volatility based on the standard deviation of daily
logarithmic returns of the previous quarter. This methodology creates an upward (down-
ward) bias in the returns (volatility) indices due to bank failures and should be interpreted
carefully.
7It also indicates strong correlations with the average volatility, which undermines its
effectiveness.
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[Figure 6 about here.]
The returns level suggests that the bank equity prices have fallen sub-
stantially for all countries. The first period of rapid decline started around
mid 2007, though some recovery was seen in 2009. The second period of
decline started during the sovereign debt crisis at the end of 2009, and still
continues for some countries. For almost half of the sample, the index level
at the end of 2012 is below the index value at the end of 2004. Greece,
Belgium, Ireland, Portugal and Italy witnessed the highest drop while Fin-
land and Austria were largely unaffected. In some countries (like Portugal
and Ireland) the index level shows a dramatic recovery post crisis. These
spikes are due to the sudden drop in sample size due to bank failures and are
therefore more notable for small countries having fewer banks.
The volatility of small countries (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, the Nether-
lands and Austria) is relatively high. Post 2009, the volatility dropped for
most EMU countries but has not yet returned to its pre-crisis level. European
sovereign debt crisis, loss of market confidence and the need for continuous
monetary support to banking sector may be explanations for the relatively
high average volatility in peripheral countries. Given the changes in the sam-
ple size in a few peripheral countries, the shift in the mean volatility level
needs to be interpreted with caution.
Equity indices and aDtD during the crisis: To compare the performance
of equity indices with aDtD during the crisis, we analyze the country-wise
behavior of market returns with aDtD during the financial crisis. As a pre-
dictive indicator of future health, we examine the possibility by comparing
the cumulative returns from 2007-Q2 and 2008-Q2 to 2009Q1 with the fall
in level of aDtD indicator in each country. Figure 7a summarizes this infor-
mation aptly. As can be seen, most of the fall in aDtD occurred between
2007-Q2 and 2008-Q2, indicating a direct obvious prediction of vulnerability
prior to the crisis. However, the total drop in returns shows no correlation
with the drop in aDtD.
Do initial level of aDtD matters?: Whether or not the initial level of
aDtD matters, we plot the initial level of aDtD with the drop in aDtD
during the crisis (Figure 7b) and find a positive relationship. This suggests
that higher initial levels of aDtD experienced higher corrections during this
period. The aDtD for most EMU countries averaged between 4 to 5 prior to
the crisis. During the crisis (between 2007-Q2 and 2009-Q1), it fell sharply
for Austria, France and Italy while for Portugal, Spain and Greece, the cor-
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rections were lower than expected.
[Figure 7 about here.]
4.2. Does aDtD render utile insights into market sentiments?
Here we explore the association of aDtD with a selection of indicators
covering broad market sentiments and sectoral bank indices collected from
independent agencies, professional market data providers and other academic
authors.
At country level: We consider six variables as proxy for market sentiment:
a consumer confidence indicator (CCI), stock returns (RET), the credit rating
(RAT), a fiscal stance indicator (FSI), stock volatility (VOL), rating (RAT)
and an index of economic policy uncertainty (EPU). As for the national bank
indices, we examine two sectoral equities indices covering banks and financial
services (Table 3).
Table 4 shows that for the individual countries we find a positive associ-
ation between aDtD, CCI and RET. In 7 out of 11 cases we detect a strong
connection between our indicator and CCI, while for the RET we obtain
a moderate or strong relationship in 6 out of 11. We also find a relatively
moderate negative association with RAT and EPU and a strong negative cor-
relation with VOL. For FSI we obtain mixed results. For the sectoral bank
indices, regardless of the DtD indicator, our results suggest a moderate posi-
tive association with both DSBANKS and DSFIN. The findings suggest that
aDtDs are capturing the underlying trends that generate differences in risk
perceptions of national banking system.
[Table 3 about here.]
[Table 4 about here.]
At regional (Eurozone) level: We did a similar exercise to understand the
association between regional market sentiments and financial indicators with
aDtD. We find a strong positive association between aDtDs and the re-
gional consumer confidence indicator and a strong negative relationship with
regional economic policy uncertainty and regional financial market volatility.
The associations with the indicator of credit quality in the EMU corpo-
rate market and regional fiscal stance are moderate and positive while their
connection with regional interest rate volatility (1-year forward) is mixed.
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Regarding the regional sectoral bank indices, there is evidence of a strong
association with aDtDs in most cases. Interestingly, the aDtDs in the pe-
ripheral countries strongly influence all EMU bank indices (both GIIPS8 and
non-GIIPS), suggesting a strong co-movement tendencies among banking in-
dices.9
4.3. Can aDtD perform better than regulatory measure of prudential risk?
We examine how country-wise aDtD perform with respect to the Euro-
pean SIFI based aggregate banking risk indicator (ECB DtD) used by the
European Central Bank. To check the better predictive ability of aDtD,
we plot the ECBDtD together with aDtD in Figure 5. The graphical evi-
dence suggests that aDtDs do suggest the deteriorating market conditions in
most peripheral EMU countries (Spain, Ireland, Greece and Italy) and some
central countries (Germany, Belgium and Finland) prior to the ECBDtD.10
An additional dimension of considering comprehensive list of banks for
each country is the increased informational content. To test whether this
has a significant effect, we create a time-series of average DtD of all EMU
banks in our sample (EMU-aDtD) and explore its relationship with the EMU
macroeconomic uncertainty indicators compiled by the European Central
Bank (2013) from a set of diverse sources: (1) measures of uncertainty per-
ceived by economic agents about the future economic situation based on
surveys; (2) measures of uncertainty or of risk aversion based on financial
8Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
9Complete detail of regional indices and correlations are not attached to save space but
are available upon request.
10Further results (not shown here, but available from the authors upon request) suggest
that default risk might be higher in the case of multinational rather than domestic oriented
banks. ECB’s calculation of DtD based on SIFIs also suggests that the level of aggregate
DtD is low for SIFI. This is important, since multinational banks not only mean more
interconnectedness, but also serve as buffer of regional shocks (Belke and Gros (2015)).
Indeed, cross-border capital flows in the form of equity appear to be much more stable
than those taking the form of credit, especially inter-bank credit. Moreover, credit booms
and bust leave a debt overhang and losses can materialize only via insolvencies, whereas
equity flows absorb automatically losses in case of a bust and provide the cross border
owner with incentives to continue to provide financing. It follows that cross-border banks
can absorb regional shocks. But large banks pose the ‘too big to fail’ problem and they
would also propagate regional shocks, especially if they originate in large countries, to the
entire area (Belke (2013), Belke and Gros (2015)).
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market indicators; and (3) measures of economic policy uncertainty. As far
as the EMU banking risk measure is concerned, we use the ECBDtD.
Regarding the measures of uncertainty related to future economic out-
comes, we use the degree of disagreement about the projections for activity
between professional forecasters measured as the standard deviation of the
projections from Consensus Economics for annual real GDP growth in the fol-
lowing calendar year (ECBANY), the average “aggregate uncertainty”from
the ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters (ECBBAVE), combining both
disagreement between forecasters and individual uncertainty, and an indi-
cator capturing the uncertainty of private households (ECBCHOU) and en-
terprises (ECBCBUS) based on the European Commission’s Business and
Consumer Surveys. Additionally, to account for the concerns for the stabil-
ity of the euro we have used the indicator built up by Klose and Weigert
(2012) which reflects the market expectation of the probability that at least
one euro area country will have left the currency union by the end of 2013
(EUROINST).
To assess financial market uncertainty or risk aversion measures, we use an
average of a set of financial market indicators (implied bond and stock mar-
ket volatility, implied EUR/US dollar volatility and CDS spreads over gov-
ernment bond yields) and a number of systemic stress indicators (exchange
rate volatility, equity market volatility, bond market volatility, money market
volatility, financial intermediation and a composite systemic stress indicator)
(ECBDAVE).
With respect to economic policy uncertainty, we use an index based on
the newspaper coverage of policy-related economic uncertainty and the dis-
agreement between forecasters with regard to the outlook for inflation and
budget balances: These components are aggregated using weights of 50% for
the former and 25% for each of the dispersion measures (ECBEAVE). Addi-
tionally, we make use of an indicator that combines all the individual sets of
series by principal component analysis (ECBFPC). We select these measures
of uncertainty because they show a significant negative correlation with key
macroeconomic variables, such as quarterly growth rates of real GDP, total
investment, private consumption and, in particular, total employment.
Table 5 summarizes the correlations of these ECB regulatory indicators
with EMU-aDtD. As can be seen, we find a significant and negative as-
sociation between our indicators of EMU banking risk based on DtD and
the various measures of macroeconomic uncertainty, suggesting that higher
banking risk (signaled by a reduction in DtD) will increase macroeconomic
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uncertainty and, as a consequence, adversely affect macroeconomic events.
To test the predictive ability of this indicator with respect to the reg-
ulatory indicators, we assessed the possible existence of Granger-causality.
As can be seen in Table 6, with the sole exception of ECBCHOU, we find
a significant unidirectional Granger-causality relationship running from our
indicators of EMU banking risk to both the various measures of macroeco-
nomic uncertainty and the banking risk indicator used by the ECB. This re-
sult gives further support to the hypothesized interconnection between DtDs
and macroeconomic uncertainty and banking risk.
[Table 5 about here.]
[Table 6 about here.]
Summary: Our empirical estimates using country level indices suggest
that the country-wise aDtD has better predictive ability than the market
based measures (returns and volatility) and is strongly connected with market
sentiments at national and regional level. The initial level of aDtD matters
and the drop is more significant for countries having higher aDtD. aDtD
also have strong correlations with regulatory measures of risk and has higher
information content. The direction of causality runs from aDtD to regulatory
measures.
5. Connectedness among countries banking risk
In this section, we explore the linkages between aDtD using a cross coun-
try connectedness measures. We use three ways to measure the connected-
ness: (1) Correlations; (2) Granger causality; and (3) Diebold-Yilmaz con-
nectedness index (DYCI) based on the variance decomposition of forecast
errors.
5.1. Correlation measures
To understand the co-movement properties, we use three correlation mea-
sures (parametric: Pearson, and non-parametric: Spearman and Kendell) in
our analysis.11 Since the Pearson measure is the most commonly used, we
report our findings based on Pearson correlations only, but they are also
robust based on other measures.
11This avoids any bias arising from potential non-linear dependencies and confirms the
robustness of our findings.
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[Table 7 about here.]
For each measure of correlations, we first estimate the pair-wise corre-
lations between the aDtD (Table 7). As can be seen, we find a strong
correlation12 between indices, which suggests a common risk factor. This
may also be due to the small sample, which contains two crisis episodes. To
understand the time varying correlation dynamics, we tested for correlations
using pre-/post crisis windows and apply a signed rank test to evaluate the
null hypothesis that the mean and median correlations are equal if we divide
the time period in two half (pre and post 2009-Q4).
The results suggest that except Germany and Finland, all other countries
shows very strong correlations with EMU average. This also suggest a com-
mon risk factor which we test in the next section. Belgium, Greece, Italy and
Portugal have strong inter-linkages and connections across the board. Bel-
gian banking sector shows strong connections with all EMU countries except
Germany and the Netherlands. Germany is strongly connected with only
Italy and moderately to France, Austria and Finland. For other peripheral
countries, Germany has weak correlations.
5.2. Granger causality
The graphic behavior of the countries’ aDtD series and correlation es-
timates suggests an underlying trend. It may be due to an increase in the
systemic risk of global financial industry due to cross linkages, increased
volatility or investment in correlated assets. To understand this spillover
within the EMU banking sector, we run Granger causality tests for each
pair-wise country aDtDs. We find very weak evidence of causality run-
ning from a particular country towards the rest of the countries (Figure 8),
which suggests that the banking risk captured by countries’ aDtDs remains
idiosyncratic (suggestive evidence of no systemic component). To test the
robustness of our results, we also did the analysis based on banks’ market
capital and asset based weighted average DtD. The results (not shown here
to save space, but they are available from the authors upon request) render
the same qualitative conclusions than in the case of using aDtDs.
[Figure 8 about here.]
12We use the adjective “strong” when the absolute value of the correlation is above 0.8,
“moderate”when it is between 0.7-0.8, and “weak” when it is between 0.6-0.7.
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5.3. Diebold-Yilmaz connectedness measure
To explore further the systemic underlying component among aDtD in-
dices, we use VAR (vector auto regression) methodologies based measure of
connectedness. The connectedness is based on the decomposition of the fore-
cast error variance, which is briefly described here. For a multivariate time
series, the forecast error variance decomposition works as follows: First, we fit
a standard vector autoregressive (VAR) model to the series; secondly, using
series data up to, and including, time t, establish an H period ahead forecast
(up to time t + H); and finally, decompose the forecast error variance for
each component with respect to shocks from the same or other components
at time t.
Consider an N-dimensional covariance-stationary data-generating process
(DGP) with orthogonal shocks:
xt = Θ(L)ut,Θ(L) = Θ0 + Θ1L+ Θ2L
2 + ..., E(ut, u
′
t) = I
Note that Θ0 need not be diagonal. All aspects of connectedness are
contained in this very general representation. Contemporaneous aspects of
connectedness are summarized in Θ0 and dynamic aspects in Θ1,Θ2, ... Trans-
formation of Θ1,Θ2, ... via variance decompositions in needed to reveal and
compactly summarize connectedness. Let us denote by dHij the ij-th H-
step variance decomposition component (i.e., the fraction of variable i’s H-
step forecast error variance due to shocks in variable j). The connectedness
measures are based on the “non-own” or “cross” variance decompositions,
dHij , i, j = 1, ..., N, i 6= j.
Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) propose several connectedness measures built
from pieces of variance decompositions in which the forecast error variance
of variable i is decomposed into parts attributed to the various variables
in the system. Here we provide a snapshot of their connectedness index.
They proposed a connectedness table such as Table 8 to understand the
various connectedness measures and their relationships. Its main upper-left
NxN block, that contains the variance decompositions, is called the “variance
decomposition matrix,” and is denoted it by DH = [dij] The connectedness
table augments DH with a rightmost column containing row sums, a bottom
row containing column sums, and a bottom-right element containing the
grand average, in all cases for i 6= j.
[Table 8 about here.]
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The off-diagonal entries of DH are the parts of the N forecast-error vari-
ance decompositions of relevance from a connectedness perspective. In par-
ticular, the gross pairwise directional connectedness from j to i is defined as
follows:
CHi←j = d
H
ij
Since in general CHi←j 6= CHj←i the net pairwise directional connectedness
from j to i, can be defined as:
CHij = C
H
j←i − CHi←j
Regarding the off-diagonal row sums in Table 8, they give the share of
the H-step forecast-error variance of variable xi coming from shocks arising
in other variables (all other, as opposed to a single other), while the off-
diagonal column sums provide the share of the H-step forecast-error variance
of variable xi going to shocks arising in other variables. Hence, the off-
diagonal row and column sums, labeled “from” and “to” in the connectedness
table, offer the total directional connectedness measures. In particular, total
directional connectedness from others to i is defined as
CHi←• =
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
dHij
The total directional connectedness to others from i is defined as
CH•←i =
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
dHji
We can also define net total directional connectedness as
CHi = C
H
•←i − CHi←•
Finally, the grand total of the off-diagonal entries in DH (equivalently,
the sum of the “from” column or “to” row) measures total connectedness:
CH =
1
N
N∑
i,j=1,j 6=i
dHij
For the case of non-orthogonal shocks the variance decompositions are
not easily calculated as before because the variance of a weighted sum is not
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an appropriate sum of variances; in this case methodologies for providing
orthogonal innovations like traditional Cholesky-factor identification may be
sensitive to ordering. So, following Diebold and Yilmaz (2014), a general-
ized VAR decomposition (GVD), invariant to ordering, proposed by Koop
et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998) will be employed. The H-step
generalized variance decomposition matrix is defined as DgH = [dgHij ], where
dgHij =
σ−1ij
∑H−1
h=0 (e
′
iΘh
∑
ej)∑H−1
h=0 (e
′
iΘh
∑
Θ
′
hej)
In this case, ej is a vector with j
th element unity and zeros elsewhere,
Θh is the coefficient matrix in the infinite moving-average representation
from VAR,
∑
is the covariance matrix of the shock vector in the non-
orthogonalized-VAR, σij being its j
th diagonal element. In this GVD frame-
work, the lack of orthogonality makes it so that the rows of do not have sum
unity and, in order to get a generalized connectedness index D˜g = [d˜gij], the
following normalization is necessary: d˜gij = d
g
ij/
∑N
j=1 d
g
ij, where by construc-
tion
∑N
j=1 d˜
g
ij = 1 and
∑N
i,j=1 d˜
g
ij = N . The matrix D˜
g = [d˜gij] permits us
to define similar concepts as defined before for the orthogonal case, that is,
total directional connectedness, net total directional connectedness and total
connectedness.
Tables 9 and 10 present the connectedness tables for aDtD based on six
months and one year horizon, along with the nonparametrically bootstrapped
standard errors, while Figure 9 shows the most important directional con-
nections among the pairs of 12 aDtDs based on the top three deciles. As can
be seen, all the connectedness measures are statistically different from zero
at least at the 5% level. To test the robustness of our results, we also did the
analysis based on banks’ market capital and asset based weighted average
DtD. The results (not shown here to save space, but they are available from
the authors upon request) render the same qualitative conclusions than in
the case of using aDtDs.
The Netherlands show very weak connectedness while Germany and Italy
shows linkages only with Finland and Portugal respectively. Spain, Belgium,
Portugal and Austria have high connectedness with most EMU countries
except for the Netherlands, Italy and Germany. Even for changing horizon,
the results remain quite consistent. In most cases, the effects seem to dry out
but the connectedness pair remain the same. Finally, we observe a value of
73.67% for the total connectedness between aDtD in a horizon of 6 months
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and value 76.72% for a year, in line with the values of 78.3% obtained by
Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) for US financial institutions.
[Table 9 about here.]
[Table 10 about here.]
[Figure 9 about here.]
6. Conclusion
By analyzing the behavior and fluctuations of a market based banking
risk indicator for individual EMU countries, we find that aDtD is an in-
tuitive, simple and convenient forward looking risk measure. The level of
aDtD varies with country suggesting cross-sectional structural differences
across the banking sector and captures trends as well as fluctuations in the
financial markets. Analysis during the crisis period suggests better predictive
ability (12-18 months prior to the crisis) for most of the EMU countries. The
initial level of aDtD matters but the change in aDtD is more pronounced
for countries with a higher initial level.
When compared with other regulatory risk and market sentiment mea-
sures, aDtDs shows better predictive ability and very high correlations. The
strong association between aDtDs and regional (Eurozone) market sentiment
(uncertainty)/sectoral banking indices also improves the explanatory power.
The Granger causality test reveals the direction of causality running from
aDtDs to Eurozone risk indicators (and not the other way round) suggesting
better information content.
The correlations analysis suggests strong inter-linkages across country
level banking stress but low inter-linkage between core and peripheral EMU
countries. Taking s step further, we tested for a systemic component using
Granger causality tests and found negative results. To better understand
the dependence structure, we explored further by analyzing the connected-
ness using Diebold-Yilmaz Connectedness Index and found low connectedness
among country level banking risk indices.
As the recent literature has highlighted huge connectedness among Sys-
temically Important Financial Institutions (SIFI) and high degree of joint
risk of default, our empirical estimates which uses country level indices sug-
gest otherwise. The country-wise aDtD has higher predictive ability and
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is strongly connected with market sentiments but the connectedness among
the country-wise aDtD is low. Suggesting that the inter-linkages may be
higher for SIFI but for the country level banking sector, the connectedness is
low. This result will be beneficial for understanding and augmenting a priori
dependence structure in the computation of systemic risk.
So, there are various reasons for considering country-wise risk indicators
alongside regional market and other risk measures. As the statistical theory
suggests, when faced with two estimators for the same underlying variable,
it is optimal to combine the two. Tracking country specific indices provide
additional information related to the average risk level and their ability to
forecast the risk buildup cannot be ignored. Following the systemic risk
indicators based on large, complex EU-wide financial institution may delay
the prediction of risk buildup.
DtD measures can also be extended beyond the banking context. The
theoretical argument being a kind of option value of waiting under uncer-
tainty can be extended to international trade literature to help understand
the impact of uncertainty on investment, export, import and employment
(see Belke and Gros (2001) for EMU case). Further extension can also help
examine the interconnection between banking and sovereign risk in the euro
area (Go´mez-Puig et al. (2015)) and to explore if the Banking Union in the
euro area can disentangling the risk of the EMU banks and their govern-
ments by influencing the risk pattern (Belke (2013), Belke and Gros (2015),
De Groen (2015)).
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Table 1: Description of variables
Balance sheet variables Source
Total assets As reported in annual/interim reports Bankscope (Code 2025)
Short-term liabilities Deposits and short term funding Bankscope (Code 2030)
Total equity As reported in annual/interim reports Bankscope (Code 2055)
Daily market based variables
Risk-free interest rate Benchmark 10Y bond yield of country where
the bank headquarter is based
Thomson Datastream
Market capitalization Daily closing share price multiplied by total
outstanding share in public
Thomson Datastream
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Table 2: List of banks (by country)
AT - UniCredit Bank Austria AG (AT0000995006)* FR - Boursorama (FR0000075228)
AT - Erste Group Bank AG (AT0000652011) FR - Cre´dit Agricole du Morbihan (FR0000045551)
AT - Raiffeisen Bank International AG (AT0000606306) FR - Cre´dit Agricole Brie Picardie (FR0010483768)
BE - Dexia (BE0003796134) FR - Socie´te´ Alsacienne de De´veloppement et d’Expansion
(FR0000124315)*
BE - KBC Groep NV (BE0003565737) GR - National Bank of Greece SA (GRS003003019)
DE - Landesbank Berlin Holding AG (DE0008023227)* GR - Piraeus Bank SA (GRS014003008)
DE - Hypothekenbank Frankfurt AG (DE0008076001)* GR - Eurobank Ergasias SA (GRS323003004)
DE - UniCredit Bank AG (DE0008022005)* GR - Alpha Bank AE (GRS015013006)
DE - Oldenburgische Landesbank (DE0008086000) GR - Marfin Investment Group (GRS314003005)
DE - Deutsche Postbank AG (DE0008001009) GR - Attica Bank SA-Bank of Attica SA (GRS001003003)
DE - UmweltBank AG (DE0005570808) GR - General Bank of Greece SA (GRS002003010)
DE - Hypo Real Estate Holding AG (DE0008027707)* IE - Depfa Bank Plc (IE0072559994)*
DE - HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt AG (DE0008115106) IE - Irish Bank Resolution Corp. Ltd. (IE00B06H8J93)*
DE - Deutsche Bank AG (DE0005140008) IE - Permanent TSB Plc (IE0004678656)*
DE - Commerzbank AG (DE000CBK1001) IE - Bank of Ireland (IE0030606259)
DE - Wu¨stenrot & Wu¨rttembergische (DE0008051004) IE - Allied Irish Banks plc (IE0000197834)
DE - Comdirect Bank AG (DE0005428007) IT - UniCredit SpA (IT0004781412)
DE - Net-M Privatbank 1891 AG (DE0008013400)* IT - Intesa Sanpaolo (IT0000072618)
DE - Merkur-Bank KGaA (DE0008148206) IT - Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA (IT0001334587)
DE - Quirin Bank AG (DE0005202303) IT - Unione di Banche Italiane Scpa (IT0003487029)
ES - Banco Santander SA (ES0113900J37) IT - Banco Popolare Societa` Cooperativa (IT0004231566)
ES - Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA
(ES0113211835)
IT - Mediobanca SpA (IT0000062957)
ES - Caixabank, S.A. (ES0140609019) IT - Banca popolare dell’Emilia Romagna (IT0000066123)
ES - Bankia, SA (ES0113307021) IT - Banca Popolare di Milano SCaRL (IT0000064482)
ES - Banco de Sabadell SA (ES0113860A34) IT - Banca Carige SpA (IT0003211601)
ES - Banco Popular Espanol SA (ES0113790226) IT - Banca Popolare di Sondrio Societa Cooperativa per
Azioni (IT0000784196)
ES - Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo (ES0114400007) IT - Credito Emiliano SpA-CREDEM (IT0003121677)
ES - Bankinter SA (ES0113679I37) IT - Credito Valtellinese Soc Coop (IT0000064516)
ES - Renta 4 Banco, S.A. (ES0173358039) IT - Banca popolare dell’Etruria e del Lazio Soc. coop.
(IT0004919327)
FI - Pohjola Bank Plc (FI0009003222) IT - Credito Bergamasco (IT0000064359)
FI - Aktia Bank Plc (FI4000058870) IT - Banco di Sardegna SpA (IT0001005070)
FI - Alandsbanken Abp-Bank of Aland Plc
(FI0009001127)
IT - Banco di Desio e della Brianza SpA (IT0001041000)
FR - Cre´dit Agricole Sud Rhoˆne Alpes (FR0000045346) IT - Banca Ifis SpA (IT0003188064)
FR - Paris Orle´ans SA (FR0000031684) IT - Banca Generali SpA (IT0001031084)
FR - Cre´dit Agricole de la Touraine et du Poitou
(FR0000045304)
IT - Banca Intermobiliare di Investimenti e Gestioni
(IT0000074077)
FR - Credit Agricole Alpes Provence (FR0000044323) IT - Banca Popolare di Spoleto SpA (IT0001007209)
FR - Cre´dit Agricole Nord de France (FR0000185514) IT - Banca Profilo SpA (IT0001073045)
FR - Cre´dit Agricole d’Ile-de-France (FR0000045528) IT - Banca Finnat Euramerica SpA (IT0000088853)
FR - Cre´dit Agricole Loire Haute-Loire (FR0000045239) NL - SNS Reaal NV (NL0000390706)*
FR - Cre´dit Industriel et Commercial (FR0005025004) NL - RBS Holdings NV (NL0000301109)*
FR - Banque Tarneaud (FR0000065526)* NL - ING Groep NV (NL0000303600)
FR - Caisse re´gionale de Cre´dit Agricole Mutuel de
Normandie-Seine (FR0000044364)
NL - Delta Lloyd NV-Delta Lloyd Group (NL0009294552)
FR - Caisse Re´gionale de Cre´dit Agricole Mutuel du
Languedoc (FR0010461053)
NL - Van Lanschot NV (NL0000302636)
FR - Natixis (FR0000120685) NL - BinckBank NV (NL0000335578)
FR - Cre´dit Agricole de l’Ille-et-Vilaine (FR0000045213) PT - Montepio Holding SGPS SA (PTFNB0AM0005)*
FR - Cre´dit Agricole d’Aquitaine (FR0000044547)* PT - Banco Comercial Portugueˆs, SA (PTBCP0AM0007)
FR - Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale (FR0000130809) PT - Banco Espirito Santo SA (PTBES0AM0007)
FR - Cre´dit Agricole S.A. (FR0000045072) PT - Banco BPI SA (PTBPI0AM0004)
FR - BNP Paribas (FR0000131104) PT - BANIF, SA (PTBAF0AM0002)
Parenthesis contains the ISIN (International Securities Identification Number), an asterisk (*) mark
represents companies which got delisted during the study period. SIFI are indicated in italics (based on
Bank of International Settlements G-SIBs as of November 2014).
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Table 3: National financial indicators
Market sentiment indicators
Variable Description Source
Consumer Confidence In-
dicator (CCI)
This index is built up by the European Com-
mission which conducts regular harmonized
surveys of consumers in each country.
European
Commission
(DG ECFIN)
Stock Returns (RET) Differences between logged stock indices prices
of the last and the first day of the quarter for
each country.
Datastream
Rating (RAT) Credit rating scale built up from Fitch,
Moodys, S&P ratings for each country. Fol-
lowing Blanco (2001), we built up a quarterly
scale to estimate the effect of investor senti-
ment based on the rating offered by these three
rating agencies.
Bloomberg
Index of Fiscal Stance
(FSI)
This indicator compares a target level of the
debt-GDP ratio at a given point in the fu-
ture with a forecast based on the government
budget constraint. It was built by Polito and
Wickens (2011, 2012).
Provided by
the authors
Stock Volatility (VOL) Quarterly average of monthly standard devia-
tion of the daily returns of each country’s stock
market general index
Datastream
Index of Economic Policy
Uncertainty (EPU)
This index draws on the frequency of news-
paper references to policy uncertainty; it was
built for Germany, France, Italy, Spain and
EMU by Baker et al. (2013).
www.policyuncertainty.com
Sectoral bank indices
Variable Description Source
DSBANKS DataStream Equity Index-Banks DataStream
DSFIN DataStream Equity Index-Financial Services DataStream
Table 4: Correlations between aDtDs and national financial indicators
aDtD
Market sentiment indicators Sectoral bank indices
CCI RET RAT FSI VOL EPU DSBANKS DSFIN
AT 0.87 0.08 - -0.55 -0.86 - 0.70 0.49
BE 0.80 -0.03 -0.34 -0.64 -0.94 - 0.58 0.90
DE 0.71 0.40 - -0.83 -0.92 -0.51 0.44 0.53
ES 0.58 -0.03 0.22 -0.31 -0.69 -0.30 0.49 0.29
FI 0.53 0.05 - 0.17 -0.88 - 0.31 -
FR 0.76 0.56 -0.10 -0.64 -0.94 -0.71 0.47 0.90
GR 0.79 0.67 -0.60 0.65 -0.88 - 0.81 0.41
IE 0.87 0.75 -0.58 0.87 -0.83 - 0.82 0.24
IT 0.68 0.53 -0.61 0.04 -0.92 -0.64 0.60 0.66
NL 0.59 0.51 - 0.35 -0.87 - 0.70 0.66
PT 0.24 0.06 -0.34 -0.36 -0.95 - 0.21 0.23
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Table 5: Cross correlation of EMU-aDtDs with ECB indicators
Macroeconomic uncertainty indicators EMU-aDtD
ECBANY -0.62
ECBBAVE -0.66
ECBCHOU -0.64
ECBCBUS -0.53
ECBEAVE -0.85
ECBFPC -0.85
EUROINST -0.94
Banking risk indicator EMU-aDtD
ECBEDtD 0.67
Table 6: Granger causality between EMU-aDtDs and ECB indicators
Macroeconomic uncertainty indicators
Null Hypothesis F-Stats Prob. Significant at
ECBANY does not Granger Cause EMU-aDTD 2.29 0.12
ECBBAVE does not Granger Cause EMU-aDTD 0.28 0.76
ECBCHOU does not Granger Cause EMU-aDTD 1.97 0.16
ECBCBUS does not Granger Cause EMU-aDTD 1.39 0.27
ECBEAVE does not Granger Cause EMU-aDTD 0.40 0.67
ECBFPC does not Granger Cause EMU-aDTD 0.32 0.73
EUROINST does not Granger Cause EMU-aDTD 6.18 0.04 5%
Banking risk indicators
Null Hypothesis F-Stats Prob. Significant at
ECBDtD does not Granger Cause EMU-aDtD 0.12 0.89
Macroeconomic uncertainty indicators
Null Hypothesis F-Stats Prob. Significant at
EMU-aDtD does not Granger Cause ECBANY 5.08 0.01 5%
EMU-aDtD does not Granger Cause ECBBAVE 8.76 0.00 1%
EMU-aDtD does not Granger Cause ECBCHOU 0.64 0.53
EMU-aDtD does not Granger Cause ECBCBUS 4.00 0.03 5%
EMU-aDtD does not Granger Cause ECBEAVE 2.93 0.07 10%
EMU-aDtD does not Granger Cause ECBFPC 7.51 0.00 1%
EMU-aDtD does not Granger Cause EUROINST 4.09 0.01 5%
Banking risk indicators
Null Hypothesis F-Stats Prob. Significant at
EMU-aDtD does not Granger Cause ECBDtD 6.53 0.0047 1%
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Table 7: Correlations among aggregate DtD indices
AT BE ES DE FI FR GR IE IT NL PT
BE 0.83
ES 0.70 0.83
DE 0.79 0.66 0.65
FI 0.71 0.63 0.66 0.78
FR 0.88 0.83 0.67 0.75 0.62
GR 0.74 0.89 0.72 0.51 0.53 0.69
IE 0.78 0.93 0.86 0.62 0.63 0.74 0.84
IT 0.84 0.84 0.75 0.81 0.74 0.76 0.81 0.78
NL 0.79 0.79 0.65 0.69 0.65 0.72 0.78 0.71 0.80
PT 0.77 0.84 0.73 0.58 0.58 0.70 0.88 0.77 0.84 0.67
EMU 0.91 0.95 0.87 0.80 0.77 0.86 0.88 0.92 0.93 0.85 0.88
Table 8: Schematic connectedness table
x1 x2 ... xN From others
x1 d
H
11 d
H
12 ... d
H
1N
∑
j = 1NdH1j , j 6= 1
x2 d
H
21 d
H
22 ... d
H
2N
∑
j = 1NdH2j , j 6= 2
.. .. ... .. ..
.. .. ... .. ..
xN d
H
N1 d
H
N2 ... d
H
NN
∑
j = 1NdHNj , j 6= N
To others
∑
i = 1NdHi1
∑
i = 1NdHi2
∑
i = 1NdHiN
1
N
∑
i, j = 1NdHiN
i 6= 1 i 6= 2 ... i 6= N i 6= N
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Figure 1: Size distribution of banks in each EMU country
2 4 6 8 10
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8 AT
2 4 6 8 10
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8 BE
2 4 6 8 10
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8 DE
2 4 6 8 10
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8 ES
2 4 6 8 10
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8 FI
2 4 6 8 10
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8 FR
2 4 6 8 10
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8 GR
2 4 6 8 10
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8 IE
2 4 6 8 10
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8 IT
2 4 6 8 10
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8 LU
2 4 6 8 10
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8 NL
2 4 6 8 10
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8 PT
AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, ES: Spain, DE: Germany, FI: Finland, FR: France, GR: Greece, IE: Ireland,
IT: Italy, NL: The Netherlands, PT: Portugal, EMU: European Economic and Monetary Union. We
show the relative size of banking firms (by total assets in 2010) for each EMU country under study,
being the total asset of the biggest bank in a particular country normalized to one. Source: Bankscope.
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Figure 2: Economic dependence and home bias
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MFI: Monetary Financial Institution as classified by Organization for International Co-operation and
Development (OECD). Datasource: OECD, National Central Banks, European Bank Authority stress
test 2011 and Eurostat.
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Figure 3: ISO-DtD curves
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The lines represent different values of DtD for varying combinations of leverage and equity volatility.
Figure 4: No of banks used every period for each country
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Figure 5: Country level aDtD
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Figure 6: Country-wise indices
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The blue, green and red line represent volatility, aDtD and equity index level respectively.
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Figure 7: Equity index and aDtD during the crisis
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Figure 8: Linkages based on Granger causality tests
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We show the most important directional causalities among the pairs of 12 countries’ aDtDs. Red and
orange lines represent significance at 10% and 5% level respectively.
Figure 9: Net directional connectedness among aDtDs
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We show the most important directional connections among the pairs of 12 countries’ aDtDs. Black, red
and orange lines represent the first, second and third deciles based on net pairwise directional
connectedness derived from Tables 9 and 10.
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